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Abstract 
In city districts in Rome, social and economic inequalities between centre and peripheral belts 
have been increasing over the last years, in parallel to the on-going suburban sprawl. Electoral 
data from 2000 to 2013 highlight sharp political polarization too. Votes for left-wing (right-
wing) candidates are directly (inversely) proportional to proximity to Capitoline Hill. Left-wing 
coalition prevails where social centrality exists, that is in dense districts with widespread social 
relationships and many public or collective places. Conversely, right-wing parties prevail in far-
off sprawled areas, with less opportunities to meet each other, where production and consump-
tion of relational goods are less likely. Since such goods – according to scholars of civil eco-
nomics – foster individual well-being and local development, they also affect political choices, 
challenging the so-called traditional ‘red belt’ in working-class districts until the 1980s. 
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1. Introduction: inequalities and polarizations in Rome 
Despite its appellation of ‘Eternal City’, many changes have been occurring in Rome since 
the mid-1990s. Left-wing local government from 1993 to 2008 was celebrated in Italy as a 
‘Roman model’, “mainly characterized by a path of structural change, that is more oriented to-
wards ICT, mass tourism, finance, advanced services, the audio-visual industry, culture and 
R&D” (De Muro et al., 2011: 1213). This model yielded to positive outcomes as GDP growth, 
per capita income, and tourism. At the same time inequalities and polarizations arose from sev-
eral directions: social and economic conditions, urban dynamics, common goods, and political 
choices. 
First, economic growth did not trickle down in a homogeneous ways in Roman districts and 
social groups, causing widespread inequalities. In the Lazio Region, both mean and median net 
incomes are similar to Northern and Central Italy – slightly higher than national average. Yet 
the Gini index of income concentration there is very close to the most disadvantaged Southern 
regions (Acciari and Mocetti, 2013; ISTAT, 2013: 254-255). In Rome, due to the lack of poli-
cies devoted to distribution issues, “Weak sectors of society have not enjoyed the benefits of ad-
vanced growth in the service sector. Insufficient attention has been paid to peripheral neigh-
bourhoods, poverty has not been reduced, unskilled workers are affected by social exclusion, 
the middle class suffers an increased cost of living, booming house prices exclude a growing 
part of the lower-middle class from homeownership, renting a house is very expensive” (De Mu-
ro et al., 2012: 195). This brings about new imbalances, notably uneven human development 
and significant variance in related indicators within Roman districts (De Muro et al., 2011: 
1225-35). Benefits are mostly enjoyed by central sub-municipalities and some privileged dis-
tricts, while peripheral neighbourhoods gain very little from the Roman economic miracle (De 
Muro et al., 2012: 206-207). This is not only an Italian peculiarity: also in London benefits do 
not appear “to be trickling down to day-to-day residents in a way amenable to improved well-
being” (Higgins et al., 2014: 55). 
Second, building expansion in Rome has generated a great process of auto-oriented, low-
density, and car-dependent suburban sprawl by ‘leapfrog development’ (Di Zio et al., 2010; 
Gargiulo Morelli and Salvati, 2010: 131-149; Munafò et al., 2010; Salvati, 2014). This has not 
been fostered by population growth – stable at around 2.7-2.8 million since the mid-1990s – but 
rather by market prices and finance dynamics. On one hand, young or poor people and immi-
grants have been searching for cheaper but far-off housing, while central flats have become ever 
more expensive to buy or rent. On the other hand, money savers and companies prefer to invest 
in real estate rather than in low-interest public bonds, thus fuelling a long-lasting housing boom 
which has now only been stopped by the economic crisis. As a result, population figures have 
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changed significantly from 2001 to 2012 (Table 7 in Appendix). The number of inhabitants fell 
by –1.1% in the city centre and by –6% in the closest peripheral belt, mainly completed in the 
1970s. In the intermediate belt inside the Roman Ringway (Grande Raccordo Anulare, or 
GRA), mainly built from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, inhabitant numbers rose slightly by 
+2.7%, while figures grew sharply by +30.7% in new districts outside of the Ringway, since the 
1990s. Population density thereby sharply decreases with distance from city centre: 101.8 in-
habitants by hectare in the first belt, 32.3 in the second one, and 5.5 in the third one. 
However, the sub-municipalities by which Rome is partitioned – endowed with restricted 
administrative functions – are not able to face the territorial complexity of the city through ef-
fective forms of cooperation and polycentrism (Gemmiti et al., 2012). The current urban plan-
ning approach is mainly aimed at competitiveness in city centre through tourism and culture-led 
projects (Gemmiti, 2012). Outer sprawled districts are physically insulated from the city, sur-
rounded by rural land and far from urban services and working places, with the exception of 
malls. They lack common and relational goods compared to historical districts where meetings, 
civic participation and interpersonal interactions are frequent enough to foster individual well-
being and local development (Uhlaner, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Gui and Sudgen, 2005; Bruni and 
Stanca, 2008; Zamagni, 2008). 
Third, socioeconomic and urban polarizations appear to affect political choices in Rome, 
challenging the so-called traditional ‘red belt’ in working-class districts until the 1980s, bearing 
in mind though that political supply in Italy changed dramatically in the 1990s. The ‘red belt’ 
was the hegemony of the former Communist Party in peripheral zones, surrounding the con-
servative urban core of the city where the former Christian Democrats preponderated (Coppola, 
2013). For many years left-wing candidates have prevailed in some central neighbourhoods and 
in most of the historical and dense peripheral belt. Meanwhile the right-wing coalition receives 
most votes in the outer sprawled districts of new settlements. Such outcomes appeared constant 
enough in every election during the 2000s, irrespective of electoral winners and absolute num-
ber of votes. 
The aim of the present work is to contribute to civil economics and social capital debate, by 
analysing the evidences from city districts in Rome about socioeconomic, urban, and electoral 
polarizations, in order to point out some basic factors shaping local political differences. An 
original dataset was appositely built for 143 urban districts (zone urbanistiche) with polling sta-
tions, by which sub-municipal territories are further partitioned. Data were collected by merging 
a number of sources: electoral files, annual civil registry, social and economic features accord-
ing to the 2001 census, and two specific surveys on income and on public services and places 
(see Table 8 in Appendix). An interdisciplinary approach is chosen, by matching economic, so-
ciological, urban, and political issues. 
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This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, electoral data from 2000 to 2013 in urban 
zones show that a sort of ‘political gravity law’ holds, by which votes for left-wing (right-wing) 
candidates are directly (inversely) proportional to the closeness to Capitoline Hill. Main socio-
economic, demographic, and urban factors are taken into account in Section 3.Errore. L'origi-
ne riferimento non è stata trovata. in order to explain political outcomes. Such factors are 
linked to availability (shortages) of commons or relational goods in the city centre (outskirts) in 
Section 4. Empirical evidences by an explorative analysis of context variables to individuate la-
tent factors are discussed in Section 5Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., and 
by some inferential analyses of electoral data in Section 6. Some remarks conclude in Section 7 
on reasons by which peripheral problems appear to impair left-wing rather than right-wing can-
didates. 
2. Electoral results in Roman districts 
Electoral data for Roman urban zones refer to ten polls from 2000 to 2013 to elect single of-
fices: mayor of Rome, president of the Province of Rome (NUTS 3), and president of the Lazio 
Region (NUTS 2). Votes for party lists in local Councils and national Parliament are not con-
sidered here due to limited space and homogeneity problems, although their inclusion would 
yield similar outcomes. 
Both winners in the last 2013 polls belong to the left-wing coalition: Nicola Zingaretti as 
president of the Lazio Region and Ignazio Marino as mayor of Rome. Such elections show a 
very clear territorial divide, since the Roman Ringway represents a sharp rupture between inter-
nal districts voting for left-wing candidates and external outskirts voting for right-wing coalition 
(see Figure 1). Higher political consent for left-wing candidates was seen in some bohemian 
central neighbourhoods (Trastevere, Testaccio, and San Lorenzo), in many eastern and southern 
districts inside the Ringway, and in the Ostia coastal area. Conversely, lower consent was main-
ly found outside the Ringway, with the exception of the well-off internal zone north of the city 
centre, Eur business district, and the Appian Way mansions. Similar outcomes hold for previous 
elections, not reported here for the sake of simplicity. 
For descriptive and comparative purposes only, electoral data are aggregated in the four ur-
ban areas pointed out in Section 1: city centre, first historical belt, intermediate periphery inside 
the Ringway, and outer districts. The “observed variable” is the difference in percentage points 
in every zone between votes gained by left-wing candidates (who won most of such elections) 
and the Roman average. Outcomes are perfectly symmetric for right-wing candidates, since 
votes for other parties are usually negligible. 
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In every election from 2000 to 2013 a ‘political gravity law’ holds: votes for left-wing 
(right-wing) candidates are directly (inversely) proportional to the closeness to Capitoline Hill, 
where the Roman city hall rises up. In other words, results are best (worst) in the historical belt, 
average in the intermediate periphery, and worst (best) in outer districts (see Table 1). There are 
significant gaps between votes for left-wing candidates in historical and outer peripheral belts 
(see Figure 2). Those gaps range from 5.3 percentage points in the 2005 regional vote to 11.1 in 
the 2013 regional vote. Furthermore, these gaps have been higher than 8 percentage points in 
every election since 2005. Notwithstanding absolute votes and winning coalitions which are dif-
ferent in each election, gaps between historical and outer peripheries appear to be constant 
enough across time in relative terms. 
The unusual bipartisan appeal of leftist candidates could explain limited gaps in 2000, 2005, 
and 2006. In fact, both Badaloni in 2000 and Marrazzo in 2005 were famous TV journalists, 
while Veltroni in 2006 was almost universally acclaimed as the inspirer of the “Roman model” 
in his first term. This yielded some differences in the electoral behaviour of Roman citizens, 
disclosed by regressions in Section 6, too. 
The above considerations are reflected in correlation coefficients, which show all elections 
as highly collinear (see Table 2). Notably, three groups can be pointed out: first, older votes 
from 2000 to 2006 (bilateral coefficients between .90 and .96); second, more recent mayoral 
elections from 2008 to 2013 (between .88 and .98); third, the 2013 regional poll which appears 
to stand alone instead (higher correlations equal to .88 and .90 with both 2008 elections, one of 
which with the same candidate). 
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Figure 1 Votes for left-wing candidate, by urban zones (% 2013) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Roma Capitale electoral files, www.elezioni.comune.roma.it. 
Table 1 Votes for left-wing candidates, by urban belts (% 2000-2013) 
Year Election 
City 
average 
Differences from city average 
Gap 
(A – B) 
Left-wing 
candidate 
Right-wing 
candidate Centre 
Closest 
periphery 
(A) 
Intermed. 
Ringway 
periphery 
Outer 
districts 
(B) 
2013 Mayor (ballot) 63.9 -2.0 2.8 -.5 -5.2 8.0 Marino Alemanno 
2013 Region 45.4 3.0 3.5 -2.4 -7.5 11.0 Zingaretti Storace 
2010 Region 54.2 -1.1 2.8 -.4 -6.0 8.8 Bonino Polverini 
2008 Mayor (ballot) 46.3 .1 3.3 -1.1 -7.6 10.9 Rutelli Alemanno 
2008 Province (ballot) 50.9 -.7 3.3 -.9 -7.1 10.4 Zingaretti Antoniozzi 
2006 Mayor 61.4 -3.4 2.3 .2 -3.7 6.0 Veltroni Alemanno 
2005 Region 55.5 -4.4 2.3 .5 -3.0 5.3 Marrazzo Storace 
2003 Province 55.8 -2.4 2.4 -.7 -4.3 6.7 Gasbarra Moffa 
2001 Mayor (ballot) 52.2 -2.6 2.2 -.2 -4.1 6.3 Veltroni Tajani 
2000 Region 47.0 -2.3 2.1 -.6 -3.5 5.6 Badaloni Storace 
Note: winning candidates in italics; partition in urban belts described in Table 7. 
Source: own elaboration on Roma Capitale electoral files, www.elezioni.comune.roma.it. 
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Figure 2 Gaps in votes for left-wing candidates between historical and outer periphery (per-
centage points 2000-2013) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Roma Capitale electoral files, www.elezioni.comune.roma.it. 
Table 2 Correlation between votes for left-wing candidates in urban zones 
Year Election 
2013 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2013 
Region 
2010 
Region 
2008 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2008 
Prov. 
(ballot) 
2006 
Mayor 
2005 
Region 
2003 
Prov. 
2001 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2000 
Region 
2013 Mayor (ballot) - .81 .96 .90 .88 .83 .84 .80 .80 .76 
2013 Region .81 - .85 .90 .88 .67 .58 .69 .67 .65 
2010 Region .96 .85 - .95 .94 .87 .87 .86 .87 .83 
2008 Mayor (ballot) .90 .90 .95 - .98 .83 .80 .84 .86 .84 
2008 Province (ballot) .88 .88 .94 .98 - .87 .84 .87 .88 .88 
2006 Mayor .83 .67 .87 .83 .87 - .95 .90 .91 .90 
2005 Region .84 .58 .87 .80 .84 .95 - .91 .94 .92 
2003 Province .80 .69 .86 .84 .87 .90 .91 - .92 .90 
2001 Mayor (ballot) .80 .67 .87 .86 .88 .91 .94 .92 - .96 
2000 Region .76 .65 .83 .84 .88 .90 .92 .90 .96 - 
Note: Pearson coefficients; all of them are significant at the 1% level. 
Source: own elaboration on Roma Capitale electoral files, www.elezioni.comune.roma.it. 
3. Socioeconomic, demographic, and urban factors 
Of course, the above description of electoral data in Roman districts according to their be-
longing to different belts – that is their closeness from Capitoline Hill – is an oversimplification. 
More complex dynamics due to historic, demographic, social, economic, and urban factors 
shape such political differences. Generally speaking, in many areas of Italy a contrast is rising 
between post-modern intellectual elites in city centres and the traditional culture of manual la-
bour and SMEs in internal areas, e.g. in the left-led northern Emilia-Romagna Region (Ander-
lini, 2009). 
Correlations between votes and context indicators allow for a study of the main features of 
left- and right-wing districts and the identification of some relevant factors that can be tested 
further through inferential analyses. Since political choices appear to be constant enough over 
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the last years in relative terms, current analysis relates to Rome’s mayoral election in 2013, 
when the gap between historical and outer peripheries was very close to the average of the ten 
polls taken into account. 
The most relevant factor is population density: in urban zones where it is higher (upper 
quartile) votes for left-wing candidates are 66%, and 54.8% in the lower quartile, that is a gap of 
11.2 percentage points (see Table 3). Very sharp differences – higher than 9 percentage points – 
refer also to average family dimension (56.8% vs. 66.8%), public squares density (65.9 vs. 
56.1), and the share of public workers (67.2% vs. 57.9%). Lower but still significant gaps –  re-
lating to advantages enjoyed by left-wing candidates – include old-age rates, 60-75 year olds, 
over 75 years, public squares availability, rentals, and school workers. Conversely, other gaps 
relating to advantages enjoyed by right-wing candidates refer to population growth, immigrants 
from Eastern Europe and non-OECD countries, married individuals, construction workers, un-
der 15 years, 30-45 year olds, and activity rates. 
Population density appears to be particularly important in explaining electoral differences, 
through a quadratic relationship curve. Correlation between votes for left-wing candidates and 
population density is positive, but only until a certain threshold of urban crowding, after which 
it turns negative (see Figure 3). Such a threshold is consistent with the so-called ‘compact city 
paradox’, referring to the inverse relation of the sustainability of cities and their livability 
(Neuman, 2005). This could derive from problems relating to high-density districts in terms of 
excessive traffic, pollution, noise and confusion, which overbalance their benefits as opportuni-
ties of interpersonal relationships and civic participation, as pointed out in Section 4. 
It is worthwhile to note that two factors usually considered in nation-wide political analyses 
– namely education and income, or in other words social and economic centrality – lack any 
correlation with votes in Rome (see Figure 4). In Italy, highly-educated and well-informed peo-
ple are more likely to vote for left-wing parties, while the opposite holds for social groups less 
inclined to participate and read (Fruncillo, 2010: 177-234). However in Rome residential clus-
tering on social, economic or ethnic bases is limited, except for a few well-off central and north-
ern neighbourhoods. On one hand, higher education levels are widespread enough to denote two 
different social groups: both right-wing oriented small businessmen or professionals, and white-
collar public workers as well as teachers. On the other hand, the left-wing coalition prevails 
both in some high-income central neighbourhoods and in low-income working-class districts; 
the same holds for right-wing parties. It is thereby clear that employment status and economic 
sectors are more significant than education or income levels. 
The basic framework of Italian political analyses still holds in Rome though, since the left-
wing coalition prevails where centrality is high, and right-wing parties where it is low. Actually, 
such a framework should be understood not so much metaphorically in individual socioeconom-
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ic terms, but rather literally as proximity to city centre. As the above correlations indicate, elec-
toral consent for left-wing candidates is higher in historical peripheral districts with rather dense 
populations, limited distance from the city centre, old inhabitants, low family dimensions, few 
small businesses and professionals, many public and school workers, and diffused rentals (while 
dwellings in outskirts are newer and usually bought by people living there). 
Table 3 Votes for left-wing candidate for mayor of Rome, by quartiles (% 2013) 
Variable 
Urban zones 
in upper quartile (A) 
Urban zones 
in lower quartile (B) 
Gap 
(A – B) 
Left-wing candidates prevailing    
Population density 66.0 54.8 11.2 
Public squares density 65.9 56.1 9.8 
Public workers 67.2 57.9 9.4 
Old-age rate 66.9 59.4 7.5 
Age group 60-75 65.8 59.4 6.4 
Public square availability 65.6 60.7 4.9 
Age group over 75 65.7 61.1 4.6 
Rentals 65.3 61.0 4.3 
School workers 64.3 60.3 4.1 
Right-wing candidates prevailing    
Dimension of families 56.8 66.8 -10.0 
Population growth 58.8 66.7 -7.9 
Immigrants from Eastern Europe 58.4 66.2 -7.8 
Immigrants from not-OECD countries 59.6 66.3 -6.8 
Married people 59.9 66.6 -6.7 
Construction workers 59.5 66.0 -6.6 
Age group under 15 60.8 66.8 -5.9 
Age group 30-45 59.0 64.7 -5.6 
Activity rate 60.8 66.2 -5.4 
Source: own elaboration on dataset in Table 8. 
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Figure 3 Votes for left-wing candidate for mayor of Rome, by density of population (2013) 
  
Source: own elaboration on dataset in Table 8. 
Figure 4 Votes for left-wing candidate for mayor of Rome, by per capita income and graduates (2013) 
 
Source: own elaboration on dataset in Table 8. 
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4. Shortages of commons, relational goods and social capital 
After linking the empirical regularity on electoral consent to urban, social, and economic 
indicators in Roman districts, another question arises: why do such contexts favour left- or 
right-wing candidates? 
At first glance, peripheral inhabitants should suffer a low quality of life, due to the lack of 
basic services and distance from working places. However, some surveys about subjective eval-
uations in Rome do not support such an idea (Agenzia per il controllo e la qualità dei servizi 
pubblici locali del Comune di Roma, 2011: 11-15; Provincia di Roma, 2010: 31-36). Houses in 
outer districts are mainly chosen by economic factors, but they also entail positive features, such 
as new and better-equipped flats, greater spaces, less pollution and noises, accessible car parks. 
Other scholars suggest that citizens are hardly influenced by macro-level factors (i.e. city 
policies and public services), but rather by micro-level issues, notably the opportunity to forge 
social interrelations and access resources in their own neighbourhood (Bonciani, 2009). Similar-
ly, evidence from city districts in Hamburg shows that concerns about local compositional 
amenities played an important role in shaping electoral outcomes (Otto and Steinhardt, 2014). 
In Rome, since the districts closest to the city centre are densely populated, inhabitants live 
in very close proximity to each other, allowing for strong interpersonal relations and many op-
portunities for civic participation. Conversely, outer periphery is sharply characterized by 
sprawled, low-density, and car-dependent settlements with very few public squares and collec-
tive spaces to meet up (Di Zio et al., 2010; Gargiulo Morelli and Salvati, 2010: 131-149; Salvati 
et al., 2012). According to some urbanologists and sociologists, the lack of public places in out-
er districts could be a key factor, at least in Europe, since “They are places where we can meet, 
trade, celebrate religious and civic events, perform common activities, use common services 
and amenities” (Salzano, 2007), bearing in mind though that they “can also be a street corner 
or a street or a common park ground in a neighborhood or the halls of a train station or the 
steps of a church, or a string of restaurants, cafes and movie theaters that attract spontaneous 
gathering” (Burkhalter and Castells, 2009: 20-21). 
However, in contemporary Italian outskirts, public squares and places – even green areas – 
have become urban voids, scarcely paid attention to by public authorities or communities. Den-
sity and per-capita availability of public squares are proportional to their proximity to Capitoline 
Hill, in parallel to electoral consent: with a city average of 100, they decrease from 274 and 704 
respectively in the city centre to 84 and 378 in the historical belt, 65 and 97 in the intermediate 
periphery, 41 and 12 outside the Ringway (see Figure 5). Whereas in outer districts per-capita 
availability of large-scale retail chains is 103 and malls 210. 
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Figure 5 Public squares and private business, by urban belts (Rome average = 100; 2009) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Provincia di Roma (2010). 
Because of the scarcity both of public spaces and local business, in sprawled outskirts there 
are a few opportunities for interpersonal contacts and social links, so that living habits are in-
creasingly reserved. Inhabitants prefer to spend their free time driving to artificial and enclosed 
malls, while local shops decrease and commercial streets lose their traditional social function, so 
that liveliness in their neighbourhood is more and more reduced (Cellamare, 2014). That limits 
the production and consumption of relational goods, which can only be enjoyed if shared with 
others, differently from private goods, which are enjoyed alone (Uhlaner, 1989; Gui and Sudg-
en, 2005; Bruni and Stanca, 2008; Zamagni, 2008). It is unlikely to engage in collective aims, to 
devote free time to social and political activities, to participate to civic associations. Whereas 
social participation fosters individual well-being and local development, and generates as a by-
product social capital. 
Suburban sprawl is claimed by Putnam (2000: 213-214) to bring about a side-effect of re-
duced interpersonal connectedness and thereby the stock of social capital, via higher time dis-
placement, greater spatial fragmentation, and more tenuous attachment to the local community. 
However, in economic and sociological literature there is no conclusive empirical evidence 
about such a link, due to wide heterogeneity in urban contexts, analysed cities, methodologies, 
and indicators. The impact on social capital of walkable and mixed-use neighbourhoods was 
found to be positive compared with car-oriented suburbs (Leyden, 2003), while the effect of 
population density appears to be negative (Brueckner and Largey, 2008). Analyses about com-
muters or commuting time are poorly applicable to Rome, since traffic congestion and ineffec-
tive mass transit are rather common in the city, so that they do not identify sprawled suburbs on-
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ly. In Italy, the weak ‘linking’ ties shaping voluntary organizations appear to nourish human de-
velopment, with a positive and significant effect on per-capita income, contrary to strong ‘bond-
ing’ ties within families (Sabatini, 2008; 2009). Urban dynamics are related to cultural and col-
lective factors shaping individual lives, and thereby to political choices. 
Public places (positively measured by density of squares) and local business fostering street 
liveliness (negatively measured by availability of large-scale retail chains or malls) could repre-
sent two proxies of commons and ‘linking’ social capital. Although imperfect, the share of mar-
ried individuals could be a proxy of ‘bonding’ social capital, due to the presence of family ties. 
5. Exploratory analysis of context indicators 
Relationships among socioeconomic, demographic, and urban context indicators are first 
investigated by means of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA). There are no collinearity 
problems, since Pearson correlation coefficients are below .80 for any couple of variables, but 
electoral votes. Three factorial axes are needed to satisfactorily explain at least 60% of the total 
variance of data. The projections on to the first two principal components can be visualized, so 
that the factorial plan effectively highlights the structure of relationships among variables (see 
Figure 6 and Table 9 in Appendix). When two variables are far from the plan centre, then they 
are significantly positively correlated if they are close to each other, and not correlated if they 
are orthogonal. When they are on the opposite side of the centre, then they are significantly neg-
atively correlated. When the variables are close to the centre, it means that some information is 
carried on other axes and that any interpretation might be hazardous. 
The first component (35% of explained variance) is associated to education level, self-
employment, and adulthood: it therefore can be considered as a suitable indicator of socioeco-
nomic status. The second component (14.7%) is linked to the age of both inhabitants and hous-
es, in dense districts close to city centre. Finally, the third component (10.3%, not shown in the 
figure) is correlated with immigrants and population growth. Such results interestingly represent 
some synthetic factors at the base of electoral differences among urban districts, and therefore 
of higher or lower consent for opposing candidates. 
The ranking of urban districts based on their scores on the first three axes highlights well-
known sharp differences (see Table 10 in Appendix). Socioeconomic status is characterized on 
its positive semiaxis by city centre and some high-value northern districts, while on its negative 
semiaxis by far-off neighbourhoods especially to the east and the north, where great malls were 
built. Oldness is characterized on its positive semiaxis by dense working-class districts inside 
the Ringway, built until the 1970s, while on its negative semiaxis by detached houses in Appian 
Way and the coastal area, and some new districts to the east. Finally, immigration is character-
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ized on its positive semiaxis by both central zones with many foreigners and far-off neighbour-
hoods with growing population, while on its negative semiaxis by a more ambiguous set of dis-
tricts. 
Figure 6 First two principal components of socioeconomic, demographic, and urban indicators 
 
Note: Principal Component Analysis, by Varimax Rotation with Kaiser Normalization; explained variance, eigenval-
ues, communalities, and loadings of variables are detailed in Table 9. 
Source: own elaboration on dataset in Table 8. 
 
6. Inferential analysis 
In order to shed more light on the relationships between context indicators and political 
choices, an inferential analysis is carried out by means of some Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions. Votes for left-wing candidates in elections from 2000 to 2013 are dependent varia-
bles given socioeconomic, demographic, and urban context. Consistent with theoretical findings 
in Section 3, we expect that votes for left-wing candidates are positively correlated with popula-
tion density, availability of commons, oldness of inhabitants (often widowers and scarcely edu-
cated people), house rentals, limited family dimension, few small businessmen and profession-
als, many public and school workers. 
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Results show a great and unexpected level of explanation regarding political differences 
among urban districts, since the coefficients of determination (R2) range in the various elections 
between 68.4 and 81.1, and some recurring and significant explanatory variables stand out (see 
Table 4). Namely, with a positive impact on left-wing votes: population density, workers in 
transport and communication sectors, school workers, single (including old-age widowers) or 
divorced individuals, junior high school certificated people, and the share of houses dwelt in by 
habitual registered residents (excluding vacant flats, temporary lodgers, tourists, etc.). With a 
negative impact on left-wing votes: squared population density (consistently with the quadratic 
correlation pointed out in Section 3Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.), family 
dimension, entrepreneurs or professionals, and housewives. 
Major impacts and signs are as expected. The unexpected negative effect of the share of 
housewives is likely linked to their traditional support for Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition all 
over Italy, besides specific Rome related issues. It is worth noting that population density and 
population density squared are not significant in five elections (2000-03, 2006, and 2010), even 
if data referring to 2001 or its average from 2001 to 2012 are included. 
Effects of foreigners and immigrants are more ambiguous, since they depend on their 
origin: those originating from Islamic countries often have a positive impact on left-wing votes, 
while Eastern Europe and non-OECD countries have a negative effect in a few polls only. Such 
an apparent contradiction is actually reasonable due to different localizations of immigrants ac-
cording to their origin in Roman districts, although that does not represent a territorial segrega-
tion as ‘banlieue’ in Paris. Most Islamic immigrants live in the city centre or south-east histori-
cal districts where left-wing parties are strong, while most Eastern-European and Asian immi-
grants live in right-wing neighbourhoods outside the Ringway or even in well-off detached 
houses where they presumably are accommodated as domestic workers. 
Other variables have less robust significance, namely activity and employment rates (re-
spectively negative in the 2008 ballot and positive in 2005), finance and business services 
workers (negative in 2000), construction workers (negative from 2008 to 2013), retail workers 
(positive in 2006), population growth (positive in 2000 and 2005), age groups 15-30 years (neg-
ative in 2010 and 2013) and 30-45 years (positive in 2003 and 2006), married people as a proxy 
of ‘bonding’ social capital (positive in 2001), graduates (negative in 2001, 2003, and 2005), 
high school certificated people (negative in 2013), primary school certificated people (positive 
in 2008 and 2010), and house rentals (positive in 2000, 2005, 2006, and 2013). 
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Table 4 Regressions of left-wing votes by context variables, including population density  
Explanatory variables 
2013 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2013 
Region 
2010 
Region 
2008 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2008 
Prov. (bal-
lot) 
2006 
Mayor 
2005 
Region 
2003 
Prov. 
2001 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2000 
Region 
Density    
Population density 
.40 
(2.46)** 
.58
(4.13)***
.42 
(3.08)*** 
.55
(3.84)***
.50
(3.24)***
 
Population density 
squared 
-.26 
(-1.74)* 
-.39
(-3.17)***
-.29 
(-2.44)** 
-.40
(-3.25)***
-.34
(-2.55)**
 
Employment    
Activity rate  
-.15 
(-2.33)** 
 
Employment rate   
.13
(2.01)**
 
Entrepreneurs 
or professionals 
-.57 
(-6.91)*** 
-.28
(-4.49)***
 
-.27
(-2.31)**
-.43
(-4.23)***
-.24
(-1.83)*
-.45 
(-4.00)*** 
Construction workers  
-.43
(-5.32)***
-.27
(-3.22)***
-.21 
(-2.49)** 
-.34
(-4.01)***
 
Retail workers   
.15
(1.85)*
 
Transport and communica-
tion workers 
.34 
(5.70)*** 
.28
(5.60)***
.24 
(5.00)*** 
.13
(2.48)**
.17
(3.13)***
.19
(3.89)***
.16
(2.74)***
.13
(2.68)***
.18 
(3.16)*** 
School workers 
.65 
(7.48)*** 
.42
(4.91)***
.75
(8.63)***
.56 
(6.08)*** 
.56
(6.39)***
.75
(7.94)***
.75
(7.89)***
.74
(7.27)***
.78
(8.47)***
.69 
(7.18)*** 
Finance and business 
services workers 
  
-.27 
(-2.02)** 
Housewives 
-.21 
(-3.73)*** 
-.13
(-2-25)**
-.38
(-6.24)***
-.38 
(-6.12)*** 
-.25
(-4.03)***
-.16
(-2.87)***
-.22
(-3.00)***
-.30
(-4.84)***
-.28
(-5.34)***
-.18 
(-2.97)*** 
Demography    
Population growth   
.18
(2.42)**
.34 
(3.58)*** 
15-30 years 
-.14 
(-2.16)** 
-.16
(-2.52)**
  
30-45 years   
.26
(3.95)***
.14
(2.13)**
 
Family dimension  
-.16
(-3.13)***
-.17
(-3.10)***
-.11 
(-1.94)* 
-.15
(-2.40)**
-.12
(-1.98)**
-.26
(-4.06)***
-.13
(-2.15)**
-.19 
(-2.64)*** 
Single people  
.20 
(2.32)** 
.24
(3.08)***
.20
(2.18)**
.30
(3.22)***
.23 
(2.33)** 
Divorced people  
.21
(3.76)***
.24 
(4.87)*** 
.21
(4.18)***
.27
(4.56)***
.13
(1.93)*
.25
(3.92)***
.29
(4.82)***
.17 
(2.12)** 
Married people   
.15
(2.19)**
 
Nationality    
Eastern Europe   
-.23
(-3.53)***
-.27
(-4.14)***
-.34 
(-4.50)*** 
Islamic countries 
.27 
(4.02)*** 
.21
(3.78)***
 
.41
(4.50)***
.13
(2.63)***
.46
(5.06)***
.20
(3.78)***
.15 
(2.57)** 
Non-OECD countries   
-.46
(-4.69)***
-.40
(-3.67)***
 
Education    
Graduates   
-.41
(-2.28)**
-.42
(-2.55)**
-.64
(-4.42)***
 
High school  
-.21
(-2.94)***
  
Junior high school  
.74
(6.72)***
.57 
(5.85)*** 
.36
(2.65)***
.37
(2.97)***
.54
(4.26)***
.38
(2.70)***
.59
(4.77)***
.29 
(1.97)* 
Primary school  
.27
(2.68)***
.24 
(2.54)** 
.40
(3.43)***
 
Houses    
Rentals .11   .14 .13 .15 
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(2.00)** (2.57)** (2.27)** (2.48)** 
Houses dwelt by habitual 
registered residents 
.25 
(4.02)*** 
 
.33
(5.74)***
.21 
(3.46)*** 
.36
(6.01)***
.34
(5.87)***
.38
(6.08)***
.38
(7.09)***
.32 
(4.67)*** 
Adjusted R
2
 68.4 79.6 76.2 80.1 77.1 76.1 81.1 70.8 78.2 74.2 
No. of Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 141 141 141 141 
Note: coefficients of OLS linear regressions on standardized values; dependent variable = percent votes for left-wing candidates; 
t statistics in brackets; *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
Source: own elaboration on dataset in Table 8. 
Results improve as population density is replaced by factors that – according to the reason-
ing in Section 4 – can proxy production and consumption of commons, relational goods, and 
‘linking’ social capital. It is unrealistic indeed that population density could by itself impact 
electoral choices, rather than other factors of social interrelation linked to it. In next regressions 
three new variables are thereby inserted: public squares density, availability of large-scale retail 
chains or malls, availability of malls only. Expected impacts are positive for the first indicator – 
because of greater opportunity to meet up in public spaces – and negative for the last two ones – 
due to the substitution of local business fostering street liveliness. 
R2 increases actually, ranging between 70.8 and 86.0, and most of previous empirical evi-
dences are confirmed (see Table 5). Namely, a positive impact on left-wing votes: public 
squares density, share of houses dwelt in by habitual registered residents, workers in transport 
and communication sectors, manufacturing workers, school workers, and single or divorced in-
dividuals. Factors negatively impacting left-wing votes are: large-scale retail chains, malls, en-
trepreneurs or professionals, and housewives. With the exception of public squares in 2003 the 
new variables are always significant and signs are as expected. 
In order to understand the role of per-capita income as an independent variable, other re-
gressions are run on 36 areas by which Rome is subdivided in a sample survey by the Istituto 
Tagliacarne (2005). Income is never significant as a rational due to the lack of correlation point-
ed out in Section 3Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata. (see Table 6). The ana-
lyzed units are different than in previous regressions, but results for explanatory variables (with 
the exception of income) are similar enough. Notably, public squares density always shows 
strong positive effects with the exception of 2001 along with the rate of dependent employment, 
while immigrants from Eastern Europe maintain their negative impact. 
Finally, the regression of political votes by the three factorial axes resulting from the PCA 
in Section 5 – socioeconomic status, oldness, and immigration – does not appears useful as the 
coefficient of determination is low for almost all the elections. Exceptions can be found in the 
2013 regional election (R2 = .60) and both 2008 polls (Mayor .43 and Province .40). As such, 
they are not shown for the sake of simplicity. 
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Table 5 Regressions of left-wing votes by context variables, including proxies of commons  
Explanatory variables 
2013 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2013 
Region 
2010 
Region 
2008 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2008 
Prov. 
(ballot) 
2006 
Mayor 
2005 
Region 
2003 
Prov. 
2001 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2000 
Region 
Proxies of commons          
Large-scale retail chains 
and malls 
-.46 
(-8.15)*** 
-.22 
(-5.76)*** 
-.39 
(-7.36)*** 
-.28 
(-5.79)*** 
-.18 
(-4.25)*** 
 
-.41 
(-8.05)*** 
 
-.26 
(-4.72)*** 
 
Malls      
-.24 
(-4.93)*** 
   
-.25 
(-3.91)*** 
Public squares density 
.19 
(3.05)*** 
.23 
(4.44)*** 
.18 
(3.35)*** 
.13 
(2.14)** 
.20 
(3.43)*** 
 
.18 
(3.33)*** 
 
.18 
(3.02)*** 
.18 
(2.76)*** 
Employment           
Activity rate    
-.19 
(-3.67)*** 
      
Employment rate       
.18 
(2.68)*** 
   
Entrepreneurs 
or professionals 
-.44 
(-4.93)*** 
-.31 
(-5.23)*** 
-.31 
(-3.08)*** 
 
-.60 
(-7.46)*** 
-.39 
(-4.08)*** 
-.20 
(-1.78)* 
  
-.42 
(-3.26)*** 
Manufacturing workers 
.31 
(4.29)*** 
 
.23 
(3.26)*** 
.24 
(3.95)*** 
  
.45 
(6.78)*** 
 
.25 
(3.68)*** 
.33 
(4.42)*** 
Construction workers 
-.25 
(-2.67)*** 
-.32 
(-3.81)*** 
-.24 
(-2.54)** 
       
Transport and communica-
tion workers 
.27 
(5.10)*** 
 
.25 
(5.65)*** 
.18 
(3.96)*** 
.18 
(3.68)*** 
.14 
(2.70)*** 
.25 
(5.44)*** 
.16 
(2.74)*** 
.12 
(2.50)** 
.14 
(2.65)*** 
School workers 
.36 
(3.69)*** 
.33 
(4.05)*** 
.46 
(5.55)*** 
.53 
(5.73)*** 
.42 
(4.90)*** 
.54 
(5.62)*** 
.63 
(7.13)*** 
.74 
(7.27)*** 
.68 
(7.39)*** 
.70 
(6.76)*** 
Healthcare workers       
.09 
(2.19)** 
   
Finance and business 
services workers 
     
-.46 
(-4.31)*** 
    
Housewives 
-.32 
(-4.92)*** 
-.18 
(-3.44)*** 
-.38 
(-6.88)*** 
-.35 
(-6.36)*** 
-.26 
(-4.44)*** 
-.18 
(-3.44)*** 
-.24 
(-3.58)*** 
-.30 
(-4.84)*** 
-.28 
(-5.85)*** 
 
Demography          
Population growth          
.33 
(4.37)*** 
Old-age rate          
.38 
(2.69)*** 
Under 15 years  
-.21 
(-3.42)*** 
  
-.17 
(-2.68)*** 
 
-.20 
(-2.57)** 
   
15-30 years  
-.12 
(-2.44)** 
        
30-45 years      
.25 
(4.13)*** 
 
.14 
(2.13)** 
  
Over 75 years          
-.61 
(-4.32)*** 
Family dimension  
-.13 
(-2.74)*** 
     
-.26 
(-4.06)*** 
 
-.12 
(-1.91)* 
Single people 
.40 
(4.39)*** 
 
.40 
(5.16)*** 
.46 
(6.35)*** 
.30 
(3.85)*** 
.30 
(3.94)*** 
.54 
(7.47)*** 
 
.49 
(5.73)*** 
.50 
(4.80)*** 
Divorced people   
.16 
(3.25)*** 
.17 
(3.65)*** 
.25 
(5.68)*** 
.27 
(4.85)*** 
 
.25 
(3.92)*** 
.17 
(2.52)** 
 
Married people  
.13 
(2.71)*** 
    
.27 
(4.91)*** 
 
.23 
(3.37)*** 
 
Nationality           
Eastern Europe     
-.20 
(-3.36)*** 
   
-.26 
(-4.80)*** 
-.30 
(-4.76)*** 
Islamic countries    
.16 
(2.01)** 
 
.52 
(6.23)*** 
 
.46 
(5.06)*** 
  
Non-OECD countries    
-.32 
(-3.97)** 
 
-.68 
(-6.85)*** 
 
-.40 
(-3.67)*** 
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Education           
Graduates    
-.60 
(-7.17)*** 
  
-.60 
(-4.03)*** 
-.42 
(-2.55)** 
-.87 
(-6.36)*** 
-.35 
(-2.25)** 
High school  
-.15 
(-2.27)** 
        
Junior high school   
.25 
(2.06)** 
   
.29 
(2.59)** 
.38 
(2.70)*** 
.26 
(1.94)* 
 
Primary school 
.27 
(2.51)** 
 
.33 
(3.70)*** 
 
.27 
(2.67)*** 
     
Houses           
Rentals    
.10 
(2.28)** 
 
.10 
(2.01)** 
.16 
(3.87)*** 
 
.13 
(2.56)** 
.14 
(2.76)*** 
Houses dwelt by habitual 
registered residents 
.33 
(6.21)*** 
.19 
(4.24)*** 
.40 
(7.91)*** 
.28 
(5.47)*** 
.30 
(5.91)*** 
.46 
(7.02)*** 
.42 
(8.96)*** 
.38 
(6.08)*** 
.37 
(7.00)*** 
.37 
(5.71)*** 
Adjusted R
2
 76.2 84.5 83.2 84.2 80.9 78.3 86.0 70.8 81.0 77.7 
No. of Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 141 141 141 141 
Note: coefficients of OLS linear regressions on standardized values; dependent variable = per-cent votes for left-wing candidates; 
t statistics in brackets; *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
Source: own elaboration on dataset in Table 8. 
Table 6 Regressions of left-wing votes by context variables, including per-capita income  
Explanatory variables 
2013 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2013 
Region 
2010 
Region 
2008 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2008 
Prov. 
(ballot) 
2006 
Mayor 
2005 
Region 
2003 
Prov. 
2001 
Mayor 
(ballot) 
2000 
Region 
Proxies of commons          
Public squares density 
.62
(6.37)***
.20 
(2.79)*** 
.47 
(6.42)*** 
.34 
(4.21)*** 
.32 
(3.79)*** 
.43 
(5.84)*** 
.47 
(4.66)*** 
.38 
(3.89)*** 
 
.54 
(4.88)*** 
Employment          
Dependent employment 
rate 
.20 
(3.63)*** 
 
.49 
(5.82)*** 
.50 
(5.68)*** 
.34 
(3.14)*** 
.91 
(9.04)*** 
 
.35 
(3.69)*** 
.84 
(7.54)*** 
Entrepreneurs 
or professionals 
-.69
(-6.93)***
 
-.75 
(-10.0)*** 
       
Manufacturing workers 
.62 
(4.66)*** 
        
Finance and business ser-
vices workers 
  
-.24 
(-1.99)* 
-.32 
(-2.59)** 
     
Students        
-.46 
(-4.17)*** 
 
Housewives 
-.29 
(-4.30)*** 
        
Demography          
Old-age rate 
.75 
(6.53)*** 
 
.34 
(3.40)*** 
.29 
(2.85)*** 
   
1.93 
(6.82)*** 
 
30-50 years        
-.43 
(-2.34)** 
 
Over 65 years        
-2.30 
(-5.96)*** 
 
Nationality          
Eastern Europe 
-.54
(-4.03)***
-.61 
(-6.64)*** 
-.86 
(-12.8)*** 
-.52 
(-4.11)*** 
-.60 
(-4.58)*** 
-.85 
(-7.02)*** 
 
-1.11 
(-10.0)*** 
-.70 
(-5.74)*** 
 
Non-OECD countries 
-.30
(-2.29)**
         
Education          
Junior high school     
.79 
(5.48)*** 
 
.98 
(7.97)*** 
  
Adjusted R
2
 85.2 93.3 87.5 90.1 89.4 87.2 69.9 76.5 88.0 63.0 
No. of Obs. 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
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Note: coefficients of OLS linear regressions on standardized values; dependent variable = per-cent votes for left-wing candidates; 
t statistics in brackets; *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
Source: own elaboration on dataset in Table 8. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Empirical evidences show a significant correlation between population density, availability 
of commons or relational goods, and electoral choices in Rome’s districts. This confirms the 
theoretical reasoning underpinning the opening sections, although a cautious approach is needed 
when targeting specific elements of political behaviours. Left-wing coalitions prevail where in-
habitants and houses are old, in dense and mid-central districts where social interrelations are 
more frequent and richer, and where collective and public places are more diffused. Conversely, 
right-wing electors residing in sprawled and insulated neighbourhoods outside the Ringway give 
rise to increasingly reserved living habits. The latter represent most contemporary Italian cities, 
influencing political results at least at the local level through a slow but constant process. This 
collides with the sparkling celebration of the ‘Roman model’ which coincided with economic 
growth in Rome. Yet this disregards increasing polarizations resulting from the distributive, so-
cial, and urban points of view. Evidence is more ambiguous for central districts where many 
foreigners live and socioeconomic status is very high, since votes for both coalitions are close to 
the average. 
Such territorial dynamics cannot be explained by the hypothesis that leftist parties are pre-
sumed to be becoming more ‘bourgeois’ than before, that is to attract well-off elites rather than 
traditional working class electors. As a matter of facts, left-wing candidates prevail both in rich 
central neighbourhoods and in working class districts in the historical belt whose income is 
lower than average; the same holds for right-wing parties. Some sharp political and electoral 
changes are definitely on-going, since the left-wing coalition has been increasing its support in 
some richer districts and losing in more socially difficult and marginal areas, while right-wing 
parties have been extending outside their traditional bourgeois neighbourhoods. However, there 
is no evidence regarding any real inversion of political attraction between left- and right-wing 
parties. Their electors do not appear to be very different with regards to educational levels and 
income. However, they are rather different with regards to urban contexts and relational goods. 
Consequently, the question is: why do shortages of relational goods and ‘linking’ social 
capital harm left-wing candidates in the outskirts? In fact, regardless of coalition they vote for, 
electors are far from Capitoline Hill which is better able to control and intervene in central dis-
tricts where the attention of mass media and elites is greater. However, two reasons lead one to 
think that left-wing parties are harmed by urban sprawl more than right-wing parties. First, at 
least until the first right-wing mayor was elected in 2008, left-wing parties were totally identi-
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fied with the government of Rome, due to an unbroken 15-year period of city administration (as 
well as nearly all sub-municipal presidents). In contrast, the Province of Rome and the Lazio 
Region have more limited and less visible power over Rome-related issues. Second, contrary to 
the higher financial resources enjoyed by right-wing parties, left-wing electoral campaigns are 
traditionally managed by organized volunteers in territorial offices. Such local activities are 
more and more difficult though if electors do not walk in the streets because they always drive, 
do not attend public squares and places due to their shortage, or do not enter into small busi-
nesses since great malls attract most of the shopping. 
  
Statistical appendix 
Table 7 Population and density in Rome, by urban belts 
Urban belt 
Surface 
(hectares) 
Population 
Dec. 2001 
Population 
Dec. 2012 
Density 
Dec. 2001 
Density 
Dec. 2012 
Change 
2001-2012 
(population / hectares) (%) 
City centre (1) 7,555 437,348 432,656 57.9 57.3 -1.1 
Closest historical 
periphery (2) 
12,467 1,329,211 1,249,445 106.6 100.2 -6.0 
Intermediate Ring-
way periphery (3) 
18,173 590,088 606,213 32.5 33.4 2.7 
Outer districts (4) 90,494 441,601 577,368 4.9 6.4 30.7 
Total Rome 128,689 2,798,248 2,865,682 21.7 22.3 2.4 
Notes: subdivision in urban belts for descriptive purposes only, based on Tocci (2008: 74-82). 
(1) historical urban core (sub-Municipality I) + well-off mid-central districts to the North (sub-Municipality II as 
well as Fleming – Ponte Milvio) and the South (Eur). 
(2) high-density working-class mid-central districts built until the 1970s + official or informal low-density suburbs 
built from the 1930s to the 1970s (borgate). 
(3) low-density districts built from mid-70s to mid-90s inside the Roman Ringway + Ostia coastal area. 
(4) sprawled districts mainly since the 1990s outside the Roman Ringway, until the municipal borders. 
Source: own elaboration on Rome civil registry, www.comune.roma.it/wps/portal/pcr?jppagecode=dip_ris_tec_rst_pop.wp. 
 
Table 8 Dataset: electoral and context variables 
Variables 
Measure-
ment unit 
Source* Year Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Elections (left-wing candidates)     
Mayor of Rome – Veltroni 1 (ballot) 
% valid 
votes 
ELECT 2001 50.3 6.3 
Mayor of Rome – Veltroni 2 ELECT 2006 59.9 6.4 
Mayor of Rome – Rutelli (ballot) ELECT 2008 44.3 7.0 
Mayor of Rome – Marino (ballot) ELECT 2013 61.9 7.5 
President of Lazio Region – Badaloni  ELECT 2000 45.4 5.8 
President of Lazio Region – Marrazzo  ELECT 2005 54.1 6.2 
President of Lazio Region – Bonino  ELECT 2010 52.3 7.0 
President of Lazio Region – Zingaretti  ELECT 2013 43.6 6.4 
Pres. Prov. of Rome – Zingaretti (ballot) ELECT 2008 48.9 6.8 
President of Province of Rome – Gasbarra ELECT 2003 53.6 7.2 
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Socioeconomic, demographic, and urban context 
Activity rate % inhabitants CENS 2001 57.9 4.6 
Age group under 15 years % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 13.5 2.8 
Age group 15-30 years % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 14.4 2.2 
Age group 30-45 years % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 25.8 4.0 
Age group 45-60 years % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 20.8 1.9 
Age group 60-75 years % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 16.4 3.2 
Age group over 75 years % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 9.1 3.9 
Construction workers % employees CENS 2001 5.9 2.4 
Divorced individuals % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 2.6 .7 
Employment rate % inhabitants CENS 2001 45.2 4.4 
Entrepreneurs or professionals % inhabitants CENS 2001 9.2 5.4 
Family dimension Average No. CENS 2001 2.8 .7 
Finance and business services workers % employees CENS 2001 15.5 4.6 
Graduates % inhabitants CENS 2001 13.5 9.1 
Healthcare workers % employees CENS 2001 8.1 2.0 
High school certificated individuals % inhabitants CENS 2001 34.3 5.5 
Houses dwelt by registered residents % dwellings CENS 2001 87.5 5.5 
Housewives % inhabitants CENS 2001 16.6 2.6 
Immigrants from Eastern Europe % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 3.6 2.8 
Immigrants from Islamic countries % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 1.9 1.7 
Immigrants from non-OECD countries % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 8.5 4.8 
Junior high school certificated individuals % inhabitants CENS 2001 26.3 6.2 
Large-scale retail chains and malls No. / pop. SERVICES 2009 1.1 5.7 
Malls No. / pop. SERVICES 2009 .06 .59 
Manufacturing workers % employees CENS 2001 11.7 3.9 
Married individuals % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 47.3 3.7 
Per-capita income Euros INCOME 2003 19,552 4,083 
Population density Pop/hectares CIVIL 2012 68.3 63.4 
Population density squared Pop/hectares CIVIL 2012 8,647 13,548 
Population growth % CIVIL 2001-12 14.0 36.8 
Primary school certificated indiv. or less % inhabitants CENS 2001 25.9 7.6 
Public squares availability No. / pop. SERVICES 2009 .57 .90 
Public squares density No / hectares SERVICES 2009 36.8 56.6 
Public workers % employees CENS 2001 14.6 4.8 
Rentals % dwellings CENS 2001 26.2 12.6 
Retail workers % employees CENS 2001 18.5 4.2 
School workers % employees CENS 2001 7.8 2.7 
Single individuals % inhabitants CIVIL 2007 26.1 8.3 
Students % inhabitants CENS 2001 8.7 1.7 
Transport and communication workers % employees CENS 2001 7.4 2.1 
* Sources: 
ELECT = Roma Capitale electoral files, www.elezioni.comune.roma.it; 
CIVIL = Roma Capitale civil registry, www.comune.roma.it/wps/portal/pcr?jppagecode=dip_ris_tec_rst_pop.wp; 
CENS = general census by ISTAT (2006); 
INCOME = survey on income by the Istituto Tagliacarne (2005); 
SERVICES = survey on public spaces and local services by Provincia di Roma (2010). 
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Table 9 PCA details 
Variables 
Commu-
nalities 
Loadings on rotated component matrix 
#1 Socioeco-
nomic status 
#2 
Oldness 
#3 
Immigration 
Activity rate .75 .36 -.78 -.08 
Age group under 15 years .74 -.28 -.78 .25 
Age group 15-30 years .49 -.48 -.51 -.06 
Age group 30-45 years .64 -.24 -.60 .47 
Age group 45-60 years .37 .32 .08 -.51 
Age group 60-75 years .67 .29 .69 -.35 
Age group over 75 years .89 .33 .88 -.08 
Construction workers .76 -.63 -.51 .32 
Dependent employment rate .67 .27 .77 -.09 
Divorced individuals .51 .44 .06 .56 
Employment rate .70 .35 -.69 -.32 
Entrepreneurs or professionals .82 .88 .17 .15 
Family dimension .43 -.10 -.64 .09 
Finance and business services workers .83 .82 .31 -.24 
Graduates .93 .93 .26 .02 
Healthcare workers .24 .40 .28 .00 
High school certificated individuals .78 .77 -.11 -.42 
Houses dwelt by habitual residents .56 -.37 .19 -.62 
Housewives .62 -.70 .20 .31 
Immigrants from Eastern Europe .67 -.28 -.34 .69 
Immigrants from Islamic countries .54 .03 .13 .73 
Immigrants from non-OECD countries .73 .07 -.10 .85 
Junior high school certificated individuals .91 -.93 -.22 -.05 
Large-scale retail chains .04 -.14 -.11 -.10 
Manufacturing workers .44 -.54 -.32 .23 
Married individuals .55 -.29 -.53 .42 
Old-age rate .91 .33 .89 -.14 
Population density .63 .13 .77 -.10 
Population density squared .46 .04 .67 -.03 
Population growth .75 -.19 -.55 .64 
Primary school certificated indiv. or less .95 -.92 -.06 .32 
Public workers .17 .15 .10 -.37 
Public squares availability .13 .32 .07 .14 
Public squares density .54 .45 .52 .26 
Rentals .21 -.16 .42 -.08 
Retail workers .68 -.77 -.27 .15 
School workers .83 .75 .51 -.04 
Single individuals .79 .59 .65 .16 
Students .51 .64 -.20 -.25 
Transport communication workers .27 -.40 -.24 -.24 
Eigenvalues - 14.3 6.0 4.2 
Explained variance (%) - 35.0 14.7 10.3 
Source: ACP in Figure 6. 
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Table 10 Scores of urban districts on the first three principal components of PCA 
Ranking #1 Socioeconomic status #2 Oldness #3 Immigration 
Top 7 
Centro Storico (I)         2.58 Tufello (III)                  2.15 Magliana (XI)                5.35 
Acquatraversa (XV)          2.36 Don Bosco (VII)                2.15 Santa Palomba (IX)            4.08 
Parioli (II)                 2.06 Gordiani (V)                 1.87 Acqua Vergine (VI)            3.60 
Trastevere (I)               1.97 Villaggio Olimpico (II)      1.80 Centro Storico (I)           3.51 
Salario (II)                  1.87 Eroi (I)                     1.68 Trastevere (I)               2.96 
Celio (I)                    1.81 Marconi (XI)                  1.63 Tor S. Giovanni (III)         1.99 
Tor di Quinto (XV)            1.71 Torrespaccata (VI)            1.63 S. Vittorino (VI)             1.49 
Bottom 7 
Giardinetti-Vergata (VI) -1.37 Malafede (X)                 -1.78 Castel Romano (IX)            -1.43 
Tor Sapienza (V)             -1.37 Lucrezia Romana (VII)         -1.79 Tor Tre Teste (V)            -1.70 
Torre Angela (VI)             -1.38 Appia Antica Sud (VIII)        -1.90 Serpentara (III)              -1.74 
Alessandrina (V)             -1.45 Castel Porziano (X)          -2.04 Grottaperfetta (VIII)           -1.85 
Lunghezza (VI)                -1.49 Infernetto (X)               -2.04 Tiburtino Sud (IV)           -1.88 
Tor Cervara (IV)              -1.71 Barcaccia (VII)                -2.16 Cecchignola (IX)             -1.90 
Tufello (III)                  -1.74 S. Alessandro (IV)            -2.62 Osteria del Curato (VII)       -2.27 
Note: sub-municipalities in brackets. 
Source: ACP in Figure 6. 
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